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The false promise of the better argument
T I N E H A N R I E D E R
Geschwister-Scholl-Institut for Political Science, University of Munich (LMU), Oettingenstraße 67,
Munich, Germany
E-mail: tine.hanrieder@gsi.uni-muenchen.de
Effective argumentation in international politics is widely conceived as a matter
of persuasion. In particular, the ‘logic of arguing’ ascribes explanatory power
to the ‘better argument’ and promises to illuminate the conditions of legitimate
normative change. This article exposes the self-defeating implications of the
Habermasian symbiosis between the normative and the empirical force of
arguments. Since genuine persuasion is neither observable nor knowable, its
analysis critically depends on what scholars consider to be the better argument.
Seemingly, objective criteria such as universality only camouflage such moral
reification. The paradoxical consequence of an explanatory concept of arguing
is that moral discourse is no longer conceptualized as an open-ended process of
contestation and normative change, but has recently been recast as a governance
mechanism ensuring the compliance of international actors with pre-defined
norms. This dilemma can be avoided through a positivist reification of valid
norms, as in socialization research, or by adopting a critical and emancipatory
focus on the obstacles to true persuasion. Still, both solutions remain dependent
on the ‘persuasion vs. coercion’ problem that forestalls an insight into successful
justificatory practices other than rational communication. The conclusion
therefore pleas for a pragmatic abstention from better arguments and points to
the insights to be gained from pragmatist norms research in sociology.
Keywords: persuasion; moral argument; Habermas; normativity
problem; critical theory; pragmatism
Arguments have become an appealing research subject for students of
global order and normative change (Bjola and Kornprobst 2011), both
because of their causal power and normative content. On the empirical
side, the dynamism of argument allows constructivists to transcend
the overly static logic of appropriateness and examine how new normative
agreements are collectively constructed (Risse 2000). On the normative
side, the power of reasons promises to lead the way to the conditions of
legitimate change in world politics (Payne 2001). Persuasion through the
‘better argument’ has been identified as a source of global democratiza-
tion (Risse and Sikkink 1999), decolonization (Crawford 2002), and
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legalization (Deitelhoff 2006, 2009). Particularly in a global polity where
institutions lack coercive power and collective norms are based on per-
suasion rather than enforcement (Keohane 2001), it seems natural to ask
when arguments are effective (Ulbert and Risse 2005; Crawford 2011).1
This concern is at the heart of recent research on the ‘logic of arguing’
in international politics. On the basis of Ju¨rgen Habermas’ claim of the
‘constraint-free force of the better argument’, the logic of arguing pro-
mises to provide an explanatory mechanism for idea-driven change of
international norms that usefully complements the otherwise static
repertoire of agency logics in International Relations (IR; Risse 2000;
Mu¨ller 2004; Deitelhoff 2009). Yet, as I will argue in this article, this
promise is based on a treacherous symbiosis of the normative and the
causal force of arguments. Studying good reasons as empirical causes
undermines both the normative–critical and the explanatory goal of
persuasion research. Genuine persuasion is a tenuous, if not unknowable,
object of inquiry that can only be ‘observed’ if scholars already know the
content of the better argument. Hence, scholars need to reify ‘better
arguments’ instead of endogenizing them. This dilemma points to the
intricate methodological difficulty of how to causally explain such a
normatively laden subject as moral discourse,2 a challenge that is reg-
ularly acknowledged, but rarely addressed, by IR constructivists.
The Habermasian approach to persuasion, which has its origins in the
German IR debate (cf. Risse 2000), provides the most explicit justification
for studying argumentative change via persuasion.3 Thus, it also lays bare
the methodological traps inherent in this undertaking and points to the
analytical dilemmas faced by students of moral persuasion. Drawing on
Ju¨rgen Habermas’ agency-theoretical interpretation of moral discourse,
the ‘New German Idealism’ (Steffek 2010) attempts at bridging, rather
than ignoring, the normative–empirical gap. Habermas himself started
from the concern that argumentation research can hardly be a morally
1 Argumentation research is a growing, but highly fragmented scholarly field that comprises
formal approaches to the quality of arguments, critical approaches to the quality of discourse,
and explanatory approaches to the processes of collective meaning making and persuasion (for
a typology, see Bjola and Kornprobst 2011, 4–10). This article focuses on the Habermasian
approach to argumentation as a social dynamic based on rational persuasion, that is, on the
agency-theoretical interpretation of argument provided by proponents of the ‘logic of arguing’.
2 Note that this article does not deal with technical argumentation, that is, informational
updating that may result in simple learning (e.g. Grobe 2010). It is only concerned with
principled debates or what I refer to here as ‘moral discourse’ in world politics.
3 Other studies of argument-driven change in IR, in particular Crawford’s (2002, 2011)
work, also emphasize the role played by persuasion, but are more agnostic as to whether
genuine persuasion is really the decisive mechanism through which arguments become effective
(see Crawford 2002, 123–126).
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neutral enterprise and attempted to reconcile normative and empirical
theory with the help of his concept of a rationally binding argumentative
reason–communicative action.
However, as it becomes obvious in Habermasian persuasion research in
IR, the Habermasian conclusions from this concern have self-defeating
implications for empirical norms research. The affirmative notion of
reason and the better argument on which ‘Theory of Communicative
Action’ (TCA) is based have led to a reification of moral standpoints as
the better argument rather than their problematization. Where persuasion
is viewed as an approximation of truth, the supposedly objective (but
empty) criterion of universality can be used to ‘observe’ rational dis-
course. The paradoxical consequence of an empirical–analytical appli-
cation of Habermasian discourse theory in IR is that discourse is no
longer conceptualized as an open-ended process of contestation and
normative change, but turns into a compliance mechanism ensuring the
socialization of international actors into pre-defined norms.
Hence, the article provides an internal critique of the Habermasian
approach to international discourse and exposes its self-defeating out-
comes. My argument draws on debates in philosophy and social theory
in order to show that Habermas’ strong notion of rationality is an
ambivalent solution to the normative–empirical dilemma. I will argue that
communicative rationality is a treacherous bridge between an empirical–
reconstructive and a normative discourse theory, a bridge that is based on
Habermas’ suspicion of ‘metaphysical’ claims rather than an empirical
agency theory. This ambivalence not only concerns the much-debated
status of Habermasian discourse ethics in moral philosophy, but has
profound implications for IR arguing research; it provides the methodolo-
gically unstable foundation for turning the ‘power of the better argument’
into a causal mechanism and thereby jeopardizes both the analytical
and critical leverage of the ‘logic of arguing’. However, renouncing the
Habermasian solution comes at the price of considerably cutting back the
promise of the arguing concept. Either scholars give up positivist claims at
empirical explanation and take a critical stance instead or they maintain
a causal notion of persuasion and acknowledge that this mechanism may
be identified where norms are fixed, but hardly where norms are in flux
and contested.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section unpacks the
agency-theoretical interpretation of argumentation as authentic persuasion
in IR. I will argue that ‘true belief change’ is not necessary for causally
effective argumentation, but rather reflects a moral necessity in a truth-
based argumentation theory such as TCA. The second section shows that
Habermasian IR can only demonstrate the ‘force of the better argument’ by
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reifying particular standards as universal. The need to fix the meaning of the
better argument has led to a recent turn of several arguing researchers
toward compliance instead of normative change. The third section traces
how scholars can respond to this normative–empirical dilemma: they may
engage in open reification and fix the content of valid norms – the social-
ization move – or adopt a normative–critical stance based on the commit-
ment to a discursive utopia – the critical move. Since both compromises
remain analytically dependent on the assumption of valid norms and true
persuasion, the conclusion points to the pragmatist sociology of norms as a
means to accommodate the normative pluralism and the myriad of non-
rational justificatory practices pervading international politics.
Whence the primacy of authenticity?
In the 1990s, IR constructivists started to call for a turn to language in
order to fully grasp the sources of international conflict and cooperation.
In this context, Habermas’ TCA was brought into play as a way to theorize
the normative structure of the international system. As constructivists
assume that the precondition of communicative action, a ‘common life-
world’ of shared meanings and norms, exists not only at the domestic but
increasingly also at the international level, Habermasian discourse theory
should also apply to international politics (Risse 2000, 14–16). World
politics could thus be understood and explained as consisting of commu-
nicative practices of agents who draw on overlapping normative resources
and meanings in order to reach mutual understanding and cooperation
(Mu¨ller 1994).
Habermas’ approach is part of the tradition of critical theory and
premised on the assumption that empirical and normative theorizing are
closely intertwined, if not mutually constitutive (Benhabib 1986, 1–15).
Accordingly, his communication theory combines a normative discourse
ethics with a sociological (empirical–analytical) discourse theory on
which an explanatory research program may be based (Mu¨ller 1994,
2004; Risse 2000, 2, 7; Mitzen 2005; Deitelhoff 2009). In particular,
German Habermasians have strived to explain the effects of arguments in
agency-theoretical terms, as grounded in a distinct logic of social action:
the logic of ‘arguing’ or ‘truth-seeking’. Truth-seeking actors are prepared
to give reasons for their empirical and moral claims and they are prepared
to be persuaded by the ‘better argument’ even if it counteracts their
egoistic interests. Thus, the logic of arguing is not only a moral ideal, but
the inevitable causal micro-foundation on which effective argument is
based (Risse 2000; Mu¨ller 2004; Deitelhoff 2006, 2009). This strand of
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norms research thus shares the persuasion view of legitimacy prevalent in
IR constructivism (see Hurd 1999) and assumes that effective argument
can only work through genuine persuasion and motivational change. The
following section challenges this causal claim (see section ‘Ontological
primacy?’) and unpacks the moral presuppositions that ultimately back
up the ‘arguing’ mechanism (see section ‘Arguing as a metaphysical
principle’).
Ontological primacy?
From a Habermasian viewpoint, argument is closely tied to motivational
change. Arguments have to be intrinsically persuasive, and this requires
that they are put forward and received by truth-seeking agents following
the ‘arguing’ mode of social action. Truth-seeking speakers differ from
instrumentally oriented actors in that they are open to be convinced by
the better argument instead of merely pursuing selfish interests with
rhetorical means (Habermas 1984, 285–87; Risse 2000). Their authentic
orientation toward consensus and intersubjective truth is deemed a
necessary condition for arguments to be effective at all.4
Consequently, purely instrumental modes of argumentation such as the
‘rhetorical action’ model (Schimmelfennig 2001; Goddard 2006; Krebs
and Jackson 2007) are viewed as ontologically dependent on persuasion
(Habermas 1984, 286–95). If the social force of arguments rests on
subjective beliefs about their rightness, manipulative rhetorical maneuvers
can only work by feeding on some participants’ honest persuasions:
‘Obviously, the rhetorical action model only works when there is at least
one other actor listening who is prepared to change her understanding
of the situation in light of the arguments’ (Grobe 2010, 11; drawing on
Risse 1999, 533). Otherwise, why should anyone pay lip service to a
social norm that no one sincerely believes in – would the collectively
manipulated norms not quickly lose their ‘legitimating force’ (Deitelhoff
2006, 106, translation T.H.)? Legitimacy thus has to be anchored inside
actors’ minds (see also Hurd 2008, 30f).
This viewpoint centrally builds on attitudinal change as the basis of
normative change. By delineating communicative from strategic modes of
action, TCA highlights the importance of individual action orientations
for the way argumentation works (Habermas 1984, 273–337). Evidently,
this agency-theoretical approach entails the methodological difficulty of
4 Note that the postulation of a universal ideal of speech has also been criticized for unduly
privileging liberal notions of political dialogue and competition (cf. Linklater 2005). For the
purpose of this article, which aims to expose the internal contradictions of the Habermasian
project, this Western bias will not be further problematized.
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how to access and study the ‘true’ motives of political actors (Holzinger
2001, 259). A German research group headed by Harald Mu¨ller and
Thomas Risse attempted to identify instances of true persuasion in a
variety of multilateral negotiations covering issue-areas such as security,
humanitarian and environmental questions, human rights, and econom-
ics. Yet their empirical ambitions could not be fulfiled, as the researchers
themselves have recognized (Deitelhoff and Mu¨ller 2005, 150; Ulbert and
Risse 2005). It proved impossible to distinguish empirically between
strategic and truth-seeking actor orientations (Deitelhoff 2006, 150f;
Risse 2007, 73). Similar difficulties have been encountered by non-
German students of argumentative change, who cautioned that instances
of genuine persuasion are hard to observe, given that actual discourses are
most of the time ‘distorted’ by more coercive dynamics (Payne 2001,
52; Crawford 2002, 123–26, 2011).
Yet also from an ontological perspective the recourse to true motives
underlying argumentative change is far from evident. What appears to
Habermasians like a methodological constraint – that scholars have no
immediate insight into the political actor’s brain and true motives – can
also be turned into an ontological argument: why should actors base their
judgment about the social validity of a norm on speculations about oth-
ers’ motivations, which are ultimately inaccessible not only to researchers
but also to the agents ‘out there’? The irreducible intersubjectivity and
performativity of the social world (Guzzini 2000, 155; Herborth 2007,
166) forestalls such immediacy. Moreover, the distinction between
thinking (true beliefs) and acting (arguing) that underlies the commu-
nicative action concept makes extremely demanding assumptions about
the rationality of social actors. Yet it is a debatable assumption that ‘true’
motives are ontological before their utterance or ‘staging’ (Goffman),
especially in situations of normative uncertainty and change that are at
the center of argumentation research (see Krebs and Jackson 2007).5
These methodological and ontological problems notwithstanding,6 the
foundational role of true persuasion is widely accepted among Habermasians
who aim to subsume the rhetorical approach under their more substantial
notion of communicative action (Risse 2000, 8–9).7 On closer inspection,
5 It should also be noted that the foundational role that Habermasians ascribe to ‘true
motives’ neglects that ‘good’ arguments can also be put forward by hypocritical speakers
without losing their (normative or logical) accuracy and persuasiveness (Heppt 2007).
6 For a list of indicators that may be used to distinguish between honest and strategic
argumentation, see Schimmelfennig (2003, 204f).
7 The ‘rhetorical action’ approach to argumentation elaborates how arguments can be
effective and persuasive even if speakers do not subscribe to their validity (Schimmelfennig
2001; Goddard 2006; Krebs and Jackson 2007). Even if an actor is not deeply persuaded by an
The false promise of the better argument 395
however, the theoretical foundation of this primacy of persuasion turns out to
be highly fragile.
Arguing as a metaphysical principle
The logic of arguing (communicative rationality) is Habermas’ analytical
bridge between normative and empirical statements about discourse.
Thus, he centrally addresses a problem that most IR norm researchers,
even Habermasians, prefer to bracket: whether empirical analysis of
social norms can ever be value-free (Risse 2000, 7, fn. 22; Steffek 2003,
253f). Habermas’ solution to the normativity problem represents a
peculiar, and radical, fusion of critical and sociological thinking that is
based on a strong notion of rationality and truth. On the sociological side,
the theory builds on the conviction that value-free investigation of norms
is neither desirable nor feasible. Habermas alerts students of moral dis-
course and of social action more generally that an impartial under-
standing of argumentation is impossible. Purely empirical observations
that certain arguments are factually accepted fall victim to an ‘empiricist
truncation’ (1984, 27) of what argumentation actually (i.e. normatively)
means and therefore cannot satisfactorily explain the acceptance of
arguments. For Habermas, a satisfactory explanation needs to be an
outright evaluation of social norms and is subject to a strong, although
contextual, truth standard.8 Whoever interprets the ‘rationale’ of an
argumentative exchange has to pass judgment on the rationality of the
speakers, as ‘reasons can be understood only insofar as they are taken
seriously as reasons and evaluated’ (Habermas 1991, 30). A more
nuanced and relative position regarding norm interpretation would
sacrifice Habermas’ goal of enabling rationally binding judgment about
empirical or critical claims (Humrich 2008, chap. 2).
The grounds on which these rationally binding interpretations are made
are no ultimate foundations, though. This is the second pillar of Habermas’
argument, she may use it strategically to serve her pre-defined interests. The same applies to the
receiving end, as the addressee of an argument may accept it not because he is convinced by it,
but because of the legitimacy costs associated with ignoring a ‘rhetorical trap’ he finds himself
in. That actors comply with procedural rules of public rhetoric, such as the rule of impartiality,
also need not be attributed to their honest deliberative attitude, but can result from the ‘civi-
lizing force of hypocrisy’ operating in the forum (instead of arena) constellation of political
interaction (Elster 1982; see also Mitzen 2005, 411).
8 The idea of rational discourse resulting in a reasoned consensus points to a consensus
theory of truth, although a normatively laden one. Not every agreement that is collectively
accepted is also rationally acceptable (see O’Neill 1993). On Habermas’ anti-foundational, but
universalist theory of justification and its ambiguous relation to the notion of truth, see Rorty
(1996), Larmore (2001), and below, section ‘From reasoned consensus to compliance’.
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solution to the normativity problem. In modernity, moral principles
are not metaphysical, but have to be found in worldly communicative
practices. This is the goal of the so-called ‘universal pragmatics’, a theory
of speech that specifies the conditions under which mutual understanding
is both possible and reasonable (Humrich 2008, 41–42). Communicative
rationality is the analytical core of Habermas’ impressive attempt at
formulating a post-metaphysical moral theory that is not based on ulti-
mate metaphysical foundations, but on an explication of laws inherent to
speech (Habermas 1988, 88, 1992, 34). This approach is based on the
‘intuition that the telos of [mutual, unconstrained] understanding is
internal to language’ (Habermas 1988, 75, translation T.H.). By means of
a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the conditions of argumentation, Habermas
explicates the preconditions of successful argument, preconditions we do
not usually reflect upon, but that we all enact as competent speakers
(Habermas 1984, 2; cf. McCarthy 1985, 276–79).
In his reconstruction, Habermas builds on, but decisively departs from,
speech act theory. In order to communicate successfully, Habermas
maintains, actors do not only have to master the linguistic rules explicated
by speech act theorists (Searle 1969, 12–17; Austin 1971, 26). Moreover,
speakers need to observe practical, moral rules such as truthfulness and
respect (Habermas 1995, 307–11). According to this conceptualization,
morally bad, threatening, or discriminating speech acts (Butler 1997) can
only be interpreted as deviations from ‘normal language use’ (Habermas
1988, 72, translation T.H.). Moreover, such deviations from the logic of
arguing are still parasitically dependent on true arguing: ‘[TCA argues
that] the use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding is
the original mode of language use, upon which indirect understanding,
giving something to understand or letting something be understood, and
the instrumental use of language in general, are parasitic’ (Habermas
1984, 288). Hence, its cooperative thrust is demonstrated to constitute
the deep structure of language, and since we all rely on language for
thinking and acting, we cannot rationally disagree with this telos. To the
contrary, its motivational force is present in every competent speaker.
What makes TCA attractive for social scientists is that Habermas does
not classify it as pure moral philosophy, but as (critical) social theory. Our
communicative competence is not (only?) a duty, but a social fact, with-
out which cooperation would be impossible (Mu¨ller 1994, 29–30). If the
telos of language – reaching mutually acceptable consensus – is realized,
this reasoned consensus benefits from the ‘binding force’ (Habermas
1988, 69, translation T.H.) of language and enables social coordination.
This is the progressive work done by ‘the peculiarly constraint-free force
of the better argument’ (1984, 28). In this sense, Habermas’ discourse
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theory is a theory about the possibility of social order, and yet one that
can account for and ‘validate its own critical standards’ (Habermas 1984,
xxxix). Empirical and critical analysis go hand in hand (Risse 2000, 17).
However, this solution to the normativity problem is debatable on
both normative and empirical grounds. From the viewpoint of moral
philosophy, the status of empirically reconstructed laws of speech is
highly ambiguous: are these empirical laws – which are somehow causally
determined – or moral imperatives – which actors could also violate
(Bo¨hler 1982, 84)? Habermas claims that even skeptics have to recognize
that their lifeworld is marked by communicative reason and that they
cannot exit the modern reality of rational discourse (Habermas 1983,
112).9 Yet how can such empirical determination be the basis of moral
criticism (Schna¨delbach 2002, 34)? Would this not amount to a naturalist
fallacy (Apel 1989, 26–28)?
It is beyond the scope of this paper to disentangle these moral philoso-
phical problems. More important for our purposes is to better understand
the nature of Habermas’ ‘empirical’ reconstruction of rational speech. For,
apart from principled reservations vis-a`-vis a post-metaphysical moral theory
(Larmore 2001), Habermas’ ‘empirical’ reconstruction of the essence of
speech is rather ambiguous. The rules of rational discourse simply are not
as indispensable for meaningful speech as TCA suggests. The philosopher
Karl-Otto Apel, whose discourse theory has decisively influenced Habermas’
approach (Habermas 1983, 54), has most pointedly formulated the critique
that the primacy of arguing cannot be demonstrated on purely reconstruc-
tive, that is, empirical grounds (Apel 1989, 1999; and see Benhabib 1986,
330–31).
Apel stresses that the conditions of successful speech explicated by
speech act theorists do not include an emphatic principle of understanding
as mutual consent. Meaning can also be created successfully without
resulting in a consensus.10 Only if successful communication is initially
defined as mutual persuasion, and thus normatively laden, does successful
communication require an arguing attitude. This, however, amounts to a
petitio principii (Apel 1999, 276–77). Apel therefore maintains that the
primacy of arguing can only be justified from a philosophical standpoint.
From the standpoint of transcendental (metaphysical!) pragmatics, it can
be argued that certain norms of argumentation are logically compelling –
that is, no one can deny them without ending up in a performative self-
contradiction. Yet, this is a philosophical argument (Apel 1989, 52),
9 Habermas’ (1991, 112, translation T.H.) assumption is that the exit option is only
available at the price of ‘monadic solitude’, if not ‘schizophrenia und suicide’.
10 For an empirical critique of the consensus requirement of arguing, see Steffek (2005).
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whose validity cannot be tested against empirical evidence (Johnson 1993,
76). That ‘real-life’ speakers share this philosophical attitude while
communicating is a tenuous assumption (Apel 1989, 54–59; similarly
Rorty 2000, 3, 14), an assumption that introduces a moralist bias in favor
of persuasion into agency analysis.
Habermas (1983, 106) has therefore emphasized that his reconstruction
can only provide a weak justification for discourse ethics. This cautionary
note notwithstanding, the translation of his theory into an empirical
research program in IR has exacerbated rather than attenuated the moralist
bias of Habermas’ rational reconstruction, which actually jeopardizes the
explanatory ambitions of the arguing approach.
From reasoned consensus to compliance
Translating the discourse ethical standard of communicative rationality into
an agency mechanism has turned out to be rather daring (Mu¨ller 2007, 201).
Since pure rational discourse is hardly ever encountered in reality, arguing
researchers have abandoned their search for truth-seeking behavior and
reoriented their efforts toward supposedly more manifest phenomena,
namely the ideational and institutional conditions of effective persuasion.
Overlapping normative commitments and a discursive setting that allows for
the free and open exchange of ideas have been proposed as favorable con-
ditions for effective persuasion (Ulbert and Risse 2005; Deitelhoff 2009).
This strategy raises another analytical difficulty, though: how do you
know ‘effective argumentation’ when you see it – especially when the result
is not a universal consensus, but a contested normative shift? As this section
demonstrates, the resulting attempt to observe the success of the ‘better
argument’ counteracts the very purpose of Habermasian discourse theory.
Where there is no factual observable consensus, researchers have to rely on
the theoretical idealizations with which Habermas defends the possibility of
a binding reasoned consensus (see section ‘Spotting ideal consensus within
actual dissent’). Hence, Habermas’ universalization imperative turns into a
treacherous indicator of the better argument (see section ‘The treacherous
certainty of universalism’).
Spotting ideal consensus within actual dissent
In order to determine whether arguing has been effective in international
debates and negotiations,11 Habermasians need to look at the normative
11 IR persuasion research mostly focuses on international norm generation by treaty-
making, since this is ‘the most common basis for international institutions’ (Hawkins 2004, 784;
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outcome: the resulting agreement and its degree of rationality. The pro-
blem is, however, that the content of a ‘reasoned consensus’ is itself fixed
with recourse to the mechanism of arguing. Just consider how Risse
praises the critical potential of research on the logic of arguing: ‘An
alleged reasoned consensus might often be an illusion, and the analyst’s
task is then to criticize it. Interestingly enough, we can only ‘‘know’’ such
a false agreement if measured against a reasoned consensus resulting from
truth-seeking argumentation’ (Risse 2000, 17).
This ‘measure’ is hardly an empirical measure. For establishing what
would be a reasoned consensus in a certain international dispute, obser-
vation does not take us far. International negotiations will rarely lead to a
harmonic situation where everybody agrees on the same principles and
their interpretation. Even if disputes are decided with non-coercive,
argumentative means, parties can agree not to agree and settle on a
compromise (Steffek 2005) whose interpretation may also greatly diverge
across parties (Wiener 2008). Telling a reasoned consensus, or elements of
it, from somehow distorted collective outcomes has turned out to be close
to impossible on purely empirical grounds (Deitelhoff and Mu¨ller 2005,
177). Accordingly, demanding theoretical operations are required, which
help to establish a counterfactual measure of the ‘reasoned consensus’.
As Risse (2000) and Nicole Deitelhoff (2009) have pointed out, this
measure can be found in Habermas’ procedural standard of a uni-
versalizing rationality. Universalizing reason serves as the principle of
inference on which the binding force of reasoned agreements is to be
based and functions as the rational presupposition that speakers need to
enact whenever they enter into moral discourse (Habermas 1983, 97).
This rationale undergirds the idea of the ‘ideal speech situation’, implying
equality, openness, and a truth-seeking attitude by all participants to a
discourse (Habermas 1983, 98–102). Habermas insists that speakers
engaging in rational discourse necessarily argue with recourse to this
counterfactual idealization that implies both abstraction (from messy
circumstances) and universalization (across all possible contexts; see Risse
2000, 10; Deitelhoff 2009, 45, 48). Otherwise, there would be no rational
criterion for valid agreements (Habermas 1983, 72–73).12
see Mu¨ller 1994; Price 1998; Steffek 2005; Deitelhoff 2006, 2009). A wider perspective on
argumentative change in the international system is adopted, for example, by Crawford (2002)
in her study of decolonization.
12 Universalization may not be required in pure ‘ethical’ (instead of ‘moral’) discourses that
are merely concerned with subsuming particular practical questions under the fixed values of a
given community and identity. Yet, where speakers adopt a ‘hypothetical’ attitude vis-a`-vis
aspects of their moral lifeworld, that is, where norms are problematized and rationally debated,
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This concept has often been criticized for being unrealistic, since power-
free, authentic discourse will probably never see the day in international
politics (Schimmelfennig 1997). However, Habermas’ argument does not
rely on a factual realization of the ideal speech situation. Rather, it has to
be judged according to its analytical value as a counterfactual operation.
The basic claim is that the presupposition of an ideal speech situation is
not a representation of empirical discourse, but still consequential for
actual argumentation.13 All truth-seeking actors counterfactually pre-
suppose ideal discursive conditions and argue as if they were addressing a
universal audience, since the quality of their arguments depends on their
acceptability in all imaginable contexts (Habermas 1999, 259; Risse
2000, 10; Risse, Jetschke and Schmitz 2002, 23; Deitelhoff 2006, 92).
Thus, the analytical value of this counterfactual idealization does not
depend on its explanatory power, but on its capacity to enable rational
decisions about the better argument – for both speakers and researchers.
And here lies a central problem of Habermasian constructivism:
The treacherous certainty of universalism
Seemingly, Habermas’ neo-Kantian principle of moral inference offers a
solution for IR Habermasians seeking to identify the better argument in a
given controversy: researchers may determine persuasive arguments with
the help of a universality test. As an empirical–analytical tool, this cri-
terion of universalization shall allow researchers to identify a reasoned
consensus or traces thereof. Even in the absence of a fully theorized
consensus, we may observe that positions have shifted in the direction of
the more universal position, and hence that persuasion has occurred.
Deitelhoff (2009) pursues this strategy in her analysis of the negotiation
process leading up to the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). She identifies two classes of arguments in the debate over the
they need to rely on universalizing reason (Habermas 1983, 113–114). This reflexivity actually
limits the domain of application of discourse ethics to ‘moral’ discourses where speakers are
not fully socialized, but reflexive with regard to norms (ibid). In ‘practical’ discourses about
means–ends relationships, and in ‘ethical’ discourses about the good life of a given community,
universalization does not apply (Habermas 1991; cf. Benhabib 1986, 298–309).
13 Evidently, this mode of counterfactual reasoning is different from the way counter-
factuals are used in causal inference. In causal explanations, counterfactual reasoning shall help
specify the causal relevance of various conditions in complex causal ‘fields’ (Mackie 1965;
Fearon 1991). Causal counterfactuals refer to hypothetical states of the world, the probability
of which indicates the contingency involved in actual events (Pettit 2007; Lebow 2010).
Habermas’ argumentative counterfactual, by contrast, is not about contingency but necessity.
The counterfactual idealization specifies the rational requirements for what may be accepted as
a reasoned consensus.
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legal design of the Court: ‘Conservative’ arguments framed in terms of
‘political reality’, stability and prudence were brought forward by the
opponents of a strong ICC. In particular, great powers maintained that
only a court adhered to by all states would be effective; hence, a realistic
compromise would have to respect sovereignty and security concerns
(2009, 52). Over time, however, a ‘public interest’ frame gained ground
that was not power- and sovereignty-preserving, but based on the prin-
ciples of law and morality. An independent and impartial court was
supported by arguments ‘based on the potentially universal principles of
equality and impartiality’ (2009, 53). The negotiation shift toward a
rather strong ICC against the interests of major powers such as the US is
therefore judged to be a product of moral persuasion.14
The problem is that this way of ‘observing’ the impact of the better
argument crucially depends on the meaningfulness of the universalization
criterion. And here we are confronted with the moral philosophical problem
that universality is a purely formal quality of norms and therefore inde-
terminate (Kratochwil 1989, 132–38). It is, for example, of little help for
deciding whether sovereignty or human rights shall be accepted as the basic
norm of the international system (Wiener 2007). Both candidates for a basic
global norm can in principle be universalized. Habermasians seem to be
barely irritated by this lack of substance and indeterminacy of the ‘better
argument’ (Hawkins 2004, 784). Rather, human rights (Risse, Jetschke and
Schmitz 2002) or the universal prosecution of human rights violations by an
ICC are regarded as unproblematic examples of valid norms. More ‘con-
servative’, realist positions emphasizing peace and stability, and political
prudence, however, are considered to represent invalid moral arguments
(Deitelhoff 2009, 51–52). How such normative decisions can be inferred
from universality (the seemingly objective indicator) alone remains to be
demonstrated (Hanrieder 2008, 175–79).
As Habermas’ critics have pointed out, ‘ideal’ reasoning is not only an
empirical fiction but also a philosophical chimera. If communicating
means exchanging positions and standpoints, then how would one assume
the wholly delocalized standpoint of ideal communication? What would
be the incitement for, and what the ideational resources of, discourse
(Larmore 1993, 322)? Rorty (1996, 75) likewise criticizes the thinness of
the rationality criterion, as ‘the ‘‘agreement of all competent judges
operating under ideal epistemic conditions’’ is something we can never
know whether we have attained. Unknowability and unconditionality go
14 Deitelhoff (2009, 53–58) further argues that persuasion mainly occurred at regional
conferences and workshops where common lifeworlds and an open discursive climate facili-
tated deliberation.
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hand in hand’. It seems quasi-impossible to productively mobilize this
harmonistic ideal in actual, conflictual political argument (Tietz 1993,
339–40), as universal validity ‘is too thin to help us change our minds
about anything’ (Rorty 1996, 73).
As unconditional justification is essentially underdetermined, constructivist
‘observers’ of the better argument cannot but to fill in their moral convictions
when identifying universally valid claims. ‘Idealization’ then means that
speakers and/or observers universalize the validity of their values – a validity
that still has to be justified on more substantive grounds (Larmore 2001,
110). We could conclude from this that the inevitability of standpoints
encourages an explicit scholarly commitment to substantive norms such as
human rights (Risse and Sikkink 1999) or the rule of law (Deitelhoff 2009).
For Habermasian constructivists, however, committing to substantive argu-
ments would undermine their positivist ambition to explain argumentative
effects. Instead of being observers, they would deliberately assume the role of
participants in the discourse they are analyzing.
Yet, the solution to base claims about the better argument on the see-
mingly neutral indicator of universality at best camouflages such moral
standpoints. Moreover, a reification of specific standpoints as morally
valid is no less self-defeating in that it violates the open-endedness
of deliberation (Herborth 2007, 153–54). Habermas himself insists that
the universalization principle (U) can impossibly supplement the discourse
principle (D) 500, namely that only participants in a discourse are able
and entitled to decide what is a convincing argument in a given context
(Habermas 1983, 76; Holzinger 2001, 252; Deitelhoff 2006, 95–96).
Hence, a ‘monological’ usage of (U) by seemingly impartial observers
cannot be the basis of valid judgments (Habermas 1983, 76).
This dilemma of how to determine the better argument in moral con-
troversies critically circumscribes the scope of arguing theory. Since a
meaningful observation of arguing via ‘observing’ the success of the better
argument is impossible, IR applications of TCA have increasingly scaled
back the critical ambitions of the research program. Instead of explaining
normative change, several Habermasians have reoriented their efforts
toward explaining the diffusion of already defined norms (Herborth 2007,
153). They study persuasion as a mechanism of norm diffusion ensuring
compliance with already established rules (Risse 2007, 78). As Risse
(2004, 306) claims, ‘one can engage actors – governments and private
actors alike – in an arguing process to persuade them of the norma-
tive appropriateness of international rules and of the need to accept them
as behavioural standards. Voluntary rule compliance would become a
matter of persuasion’. With this compliance turn, the collective and critical
fabrication of new rules and norms, the theoretical core of Habermas’
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discourse theory, is no longer at issue. To the contrary, arguing no longer
serves as a standard of democratic politics, but as an effective governance
device for supranational institutions: through reason-giving and public
justification, international organizations such as the World Trade Orga-
nization can compensate for their lack of democratic legitimacy and
ensure compliance with their rules and rulings (Steffek 2003; see also
Panke 2010). This move paradoxically sacrifices the democratic project
underlying Habermas’ theory, which critically relies on the open-ended
contestation of normative orders.
Studying persuasion between realism and utopia
It is not by accident that several arguing researchers have started to move
from authentic persuasion to effective compliance. The reorientation
toward compliance research is one way out of a basic aporia inherent to
the rationalist (in the philosophical sense of the word) communicative
action program. Since genuine persuasion and universal truth are neither
intelligible nor observable, scholars cannot but postulate specific norms as
‘persuasive’ in order to state that their acceptance is based on consent
rather than coercion. Such persuasion research is good at reifying specific
norms, but does not fare well in investigating normative change by
persuasion. For where both social norms and actor motivations are
problematized, scholars lack the analytical vantage point from which to
assess the persuasiveness of moral claims.
Analytical compromises seeking to avoid this aporia usually fall on
either the positivist side and abstain from normative claims or on the
critical side, abstaining from explanatory claims. The positivist solution
consists in treating persuasion as socialization, that is, in a deliberate
reification of international norms (see section ‘The socialization move’).
The critical approach defends the deliberative ideal and focuses on the
conditions and distortions of moral discourse in international politics (see
section ‘The critical move’). Both types of compromise demand strong –
empirical or idealized – presuppositions and remain committed to the
basic persuasion vs. coercion–dichotomy that leaves little space for nor-
mative complexity and argumentative practices other than persuasion.
The socialization move
As long as norms are socially contested and in flux, observers can hardly
determine from outside whether the most ‘persuasive’ arguments have pre-
vailed in a discourse. Hence, if an explanatory usage of the persuasion con-
cept is to escape the dilemmas explicated in the above section, scholars need
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to fix instead of internalizing the meaning of valid norms. This corresponds to
the move to compliance that Habermasians have made in recent years (see
section ‘The treacherous certainty of universalism’). In this vein, empirical
approaches to persuasion have been put forward that do not claim to explain
normative change by persuasion, but focus on situations where social norms
are rather unproblematic. This is the domain of socialization research.
Socialization applies where norms are not based on universal reason,
but tied to particular group identities (Johnston 2001). The socialization of
new actors into the liberal norms of the European Union (EU; Checkel
2001, 2005; Schimmelfennig 2001), the ‘international community’ (Risse
and Sikkink 1999), or other international organizations (Johnston 2001) is
a process that works independent of material coercion. Socialization
researchers emphasize that the depth of persuasion varies in processes
of socialization. It can involve the deep internalization of norms, but
this is not necessary and most likely not the most important path to group
conformity (Johnston 2001, 495). Rather, ‘social influence’ plays a decisive
part in socialization, that is, group pressure working through moral
sanctions, shaming, exclusion, and ‘opprobrium’ (Johnston 2001, 488;
Zu¨rn and Checkel 2005, 1052). The force of this mechanism thus does not
rest on rational idealizations, but on concrete relationships – and the social
authority of the persuader (Checkel 2001, 560–64; see Hurd 1999).
Testing for socialization is easier than testing for genuine persuasion:
given that a rather stable social environment can be identified, pro-norm
behavior that occurs after exposure to this social environment and in the
absence of material coercion can be attributed to socialization (Johnston
2001, 510). The challenge for and motivation of socialization research
thus consists in identifying the integrating force and resilience of parti-
cular social norms such as those embedded in the polity of the EU
(Checkel 2001, 2005). Such an empirical perspective on norm effective-
ness does not problematize but reifies particular norms. ‘Discourse’ in the
Habermasian sense where henceforth unproblematic norms are ques-
tioned and reconsidered collectively is not part of this research program.
Socialization research thus seeks to gain explanatory leverage at the price
of an ‘empiricist truncation’ that reifies political communities and iden-
tities as objective givens. Yet, the ongoing contestation and ambiguity of
European and international norms eludes such a generalizing perspective.
The critical move
An alternative conclusion from the normative–empirical dilemma of
arguing research is to preserve the critical edge of arguing and adopt a
reflexive stance toward the research ‘object’, international discourses.
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Such a normative–critical approach rests on the insight that commu-
nicative reason may be metaphysically justifiable, but cannot be recon-
structed as an empirical law (Apel 1989, 1999). However, if rational
discourse is not an empirical law, it still is a practical possibility. This is
the conclusion that, for example, Benhabib (1986, 298–309) draws from
her friendly critique of Habermas’ universalism. Benhabib maintains that
the universalization rule is not a necessary part of discourse ethics and
counterproductively introduces a ‘legalistic bias’ (1986, 310) into political
discourses. Instead of justifying discourse ethics on incontrovertible
rational grounds, Benhabib thus highlights its emancipatory potential and
claims that ‘a certain anticipatory utopia, a projection of the future as it
could be, becomes necessary’. This requires scholarly reflexivity and some
theoretical activism, since ‘the theorist can no longer speak the language
of evolution and necessity, but must conceive of him or herself as a par-
ticipant in the formation of the future’ (Benhabib 1986, 331).15
This emancipatory purpose underlies critical scholarship on interna-
tional discourse.16 It uses the arguing ideal as an evaluative tool to assess
the deliberative quality of international policies (e.g. Bjola 2005) or as an
ideology-critical tool to identify obstacles to fair deliberation (Bohman
1997, 338–39, 2010, 13).17 This requires attention to the discursive
distortions that jeopardize the quality of argument and thereby genuine
persuasion. Mostly, such distortions are sought in hidden motivations and
the intrusion of power into discourse (e.g. Payne 2001).
Distortion can also be inscribed in discursive settings with pre-defined
normative outcomes, that is, where free and open argument is precluded.
The negotiation process leading up to the treaty banning anti-personnel
landmines is a case in point. The negotiation of the 1998 landmine treaty
often serves as the prototype of a progressive ‘new multilateralism’, where
moral persuasion wins out over power politics (Price 1998; see also
Deitelhoff 2009, 35). Yet, in fact, its institutional setting has been highly
restrictive. Only states that committed beforehand to the goal of a total
ban were allowed to participate in the ‘Ottawa process’, the venue
through which the blockades of the United Nations (UN) system were
15 For Benhabib, the utopian moment also implies overcoming what one could call
Habermas’ ‘rationalist truncation’ of political subjects. Political discourse should involve needs
and desires and solidarity as well as moral reason (Benhabib 1986, 327–343).
16 I focus here on critical approaches in the Frankfurt tradition. More deconstructive
approaches do not so much debate the rationality of norms, but rather emphasize the con-
tingencies involved in their emergence and their productive power (e.g. Price 1995; Renner
2012).
17 Most fundamentally, this refers to boundaries drawn around the community of com-
munication by granting or not granting citizenship (Benhabib 2004).
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circumvented (Dolan and Hunt 1998, 37; Brem and Rutherford 2001,
169–73). In this sense, the ‘new multilateralism’ exposes the gap between
deliberative ideals and real-world consensus-making.
These ‘distortions’ of norm generation processes are of primary interest
to the discourse ethical program that seeks to unveil (and remove) the
obstacles to rational discourse. The flipside of this critical orientation is
that everything that does not meet the requirements of rational discourse
is no ‘real’ communication about norms, but at best strategically dis-
torted. On the basis of the common dichotomy between coercion and
‘true’ persuasion (see also Crawford 2011), this perspective discounts
all argumentative means besides ‘rationally convincing’ arguments as
obstacles to reaching the discursive utopia. Hence, such a moralized
approach to real-world argumentation is itself analytically distorted. It
excludes from the analysis all those less ‘rational’ practices through which
empirical actors settle normative conflicts in their non-utopian settings.
This is the price of a normative commitment that may be useful in
avoiding the normative–empirical fallacy, and yet only allows for highly
circumscribed sociological insights into argument and normative change.
In sum, the analytical compromises presented in this section demand
that scholars subscribe to specific international norms or evaluative
standards in analyzing moral discourse. In a way, both are rationalizing
and totalizing strategies. Positivist ‘socialization’ approaches reify certain
norms as valid and accepted, while critical approaches apply evaluative
standards to contexts where these standards may not be unanimously
shared. Yet international politics can hardly be said to be marked by
normative coherence and stability (Krook and True 2010). Norms can be
differently enacted (Wiener 2008), and their enactment in turn changes their
very content (Sandholtz 2008). Most often, several competing standards can
be brought to bear on world political issues. For example, non-profit
organizations have to negotiate the call for political activism with the
principle of neutrality (Barnett 2009), but also with the imperative of
competitiveness and economic performance (Cooley and Ron 2002).
International civil servants have to accommodate calls for economic effi-
ciency and results-based management with the procedural requirements of
supranational bureaucracy (Bauer and Knill 2007). ‘State-builders’ have to
mediate between the bureaucratic requirements and practices of their
‘metropolitan’ headquarters and the normative orders of their target
countries (Schlichte and Veit 2007). These normative conflicts are the very
reason why IR should be concerned with argument in world politics.
Yet such normative ambiguity and conflict eludes approaches that
postulate the validity of specific norms and/or discursive standards.
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Both the socialization approach and the critical approach avoid the
empirical-normative fallacy looming large in persuasion research. Yet they
remain committed to the ‘persuasion vs. coercion’ paradigm and thereby
reproduce and reify specific norms instead of exploring the argumentative
repertoire brought to bear on world politics. What could be gained from a
pragmatic abstention from such preconceptions will be sketched in the
conclusion of this article.
Conclusion: for a pragmatic abstention from the better argument
This article has critically reconstructed the self-defeating implications of a
‘truth-seeking’ approach to persuasion in international politics. Drawing
on Habermas bears the advantage that his communicative action theory
explicates and thoroughly theorizes basic intuitions that underlie the
concept of persuasion. However, the application of his theory in the IR
arguing approach also brings scholars to the heart of the normative–
empirical dilemma so acute in norms research. The article has shown
that despite its moral and theoretical appeal, the ‘force of the better
argument’ is a poor guide to argumentation research. As a sociological
approach, the logic of arguing relies on a notion of authentic conviction
that is both methodologically and ontologically tenuous. Moreover, its
moral philosophical underpinnings are founded on an analytically empty
presupposition: the notion of unconditional, universal truth. In its
application to IR, the ‘better argument’ serves to reify particular norms as
universal, instead of opening up space for deliberation.
Several Habermasian constructivists have responded to this dilemma by
turning arguing into a compliance mechanism, and thus exchanged the
emancipatory agenda of critical theory for a governance- and control-
oriented research program. This compliance turn is one possible solution
to the normative–empirical dilemma encountered by students of moral
discourse. It is closely related to the agenda of international socialization
research that treats particular norms as fixed and investigates the non-
coercive means through which agents are brought to accept these norms.
Through positivist reification, normative effects become researchable, yet
at the price of bracketing normative conflict and contestation. The critical
reaction to the arguing dilemma in turn renounces positivist reification
and engages in political critique. Its emancipatory challenge to actual
(distorted) discourses drives forward the discourse ethical agenda, but
also requires a distorted view of argumentation: everything outside of true
persuasion becomes mere coercion and manipulation.
The strategies of positivist reification and critical moralization are thus
premised on the same ‘persuasion vs. coercion’ problematic that underlies
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research on the better argument. This dichotomy is based on the broadly
shared assumption that argumentation follows a rational logic, a logic
that scholars can reconstruct empirically and/or evaluate in normative
terms. Yet, as this article has argued, such strong presumptions only allow
for a highly rationalized or moralized view of argument. They forestall
insight into the normative complexity of world politics and the practical
creativity through which empirical actors settle normative conflicts.
Moral agreements and orientations are constantly forged in international
politics; yet approaching them through the normative lens of valid reasons
alone a priori excludes a myriad of argumentative practices.
In order to transcend this dichotomy, scholars would have to prag-
matically abstain from the a priori rationalization of argumentative
practices. Taking seriously the means through which social actors come
to moral agreements in the midst of ambiguity and contestation,
a pragmatic abstention from normative claims could provide a new per-
spective on moral agreement as a genuinely practical achievement. Such a
pragmatist stance would allow IR norms researchers to view effective
argument not as a reasoned consensus, but first and foremost as a successful
performance.
In this vein, recent pragmatist contributions to the sociology of norms
show how a practice-centered approach to norms and morality transcends
the legalism of communicative action theory. It is based on a pragmatist
conception of social actors as acting rather than theoretical beings (Joas
1996), a conception that is also gaining ground in IR theory (Hellmann
2009; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). On the basis of this non-rationalist
ontology, Hans Joas has argued that communication about values has an
important emotive component, and often relies on successful narratives
much more than on compelling reasons. Drawing particularly on American
pragmatism, Joas therefore calls for a reorientation of social theory toward
the role of collective emotions and cultural traditions in the negotiation of
normative orders (Joas 2000, 2001).
Similarly, a performance-centered approach to moral discourse – in
their terms: justification – has recently been developed by the so-called
French school of pragmatism around Boltanski and The´venot (1999,
2006). This approach starts from the observation of an irreducible – and
rationally irresolvable – plurality of moral standards. Accordingly, morally
complex situations are not resolved through rational generalization and
truth-seeking, but through the performance of critical ‘tests’ (Boltanski
and The´venot (2006, 40). These tests rely on the mobilization of manifold
cognitive and material devices (‘things’) other than abstract reasons. This
performativity perspective would allow IR norms researchers to integrate
the status of various objects – blue helmets, the UN flag, and symbols
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(see Hurd 2002) – in the analysis of normative struggles. Likewise, cog-
nitive devices such as evaluation techniques and statistical representations
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 45–72) and representative tools such as
amnesty international’s practice of eyewitness accounts (Wilson 1997)
could be analyzed as part of the critical repertoire of international actors.
A pragmatic abstention from the rationalizing view of discourse would
thus accord worldly and non-rational dimensions of argumentative
practice a more prominent analytical status. Pragmatist norms research
would not so much be concerned with normative superiority (Deitelhoff
2009, 35) but with successful practice. Even the invocation of power and
authority might be accommodated within the pragmatist framework; not
as an unreal distortion of discourse, but as an argumentative operation
that can succeed or fail. Such a pragmatist move would also resonate with
recent attempts at integrating the ontology of practices (Adler and Pouliot
2011) and practical reason (Kornprobst 2011) into IR theory. Normatively
speaking, it would take its critical standards not from compelling philoso-
phical arguments, but from competent actors and their critical operations.
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